Even the CNBC talking heads called BS on CW’s “love the set up” nonsense. Kramer said it’s like a “football coach down 21-0 at the half telling his team that they have their opponent right where they want them.” Perhaps in 5 years ARKK will be sitting pretty, but I wouldn’t be beating my chest knowing I bought a ton of stocks that dropped 30%+ in about two months.
OT: Stock and Investment Talk
- Thread starter RU-05
- Start date
Here’s my beef with you T2Kplus20. When all of these spec tech stocks, including among others Tesla and ARKK, were at all-time highs you did nothing but rip the 3LBs and tell everyone to buy, buy, buy - completely ignoring the risks and preposterous valuations. Anyone that actually listened to you is in a world of shit at the moment. I’m not even saying you may not prove us wrong in the long term. But, the valuations made no sense and an obvious sector rotation was underway yet you slammed anyone that didn’t drink your KoolAid. I get it - you own these stocks and feel the need to support/pump them. Heck, I’ve got biotech plays and other spec opportunities too but I would never push them to this group out of fear that I may lose someone money.
So this was my comment that you said was full of crap: “Another very solid day for my portfolio of companies that consistently generate solid earnings.” How would you know how my 45 stocks are doing? Speculation?
At the time of my post, my TDAMERITRADE stocks were up 1.05% and ended up 0.47%, my Schwab PCRS was up 0.44% and ended down to -0.27% as the overall market retreated. Still a positive overall day, considering the S&P was -1.04, NASDAQ -2.55% and ARKK -5.23%.
there is zero chance my math is silly, given the information you previously posted. (See below)
You asked me to come up with a better answer, so here goes.
Your posts:
3/3/2021: “Bought more ARKK today (which is the only ARK option that I am in). I moved around a few etfs/funds in my accounts to consolidate. Still positive for ARKK.....barely.”
- well, ARKK ranged between 120 and 129 that day, so a cost basis around $120.
3/3/2021: “ARKK is 6-7% of our total retirement portfolio. Some nice juice, but nothing too big.”
- well 6-7% was a large position, given your large investment portfolio. So you had a large position around $120 a share.
3/20/2021: “worked my ARKK price down to $122'ish over the past month.”
4/5/2021: in response to my post, you write: “CB [cost basis forARK] is closer to $114 and it's a wonderful add to the portfolio.
- simple math would indicate that to go from a cost basis of $122 to $114 when the stock only bottomed out at about $110 as of last Wednesday would need well north of doubling your portfolio. A portfolio that was already significant. (6-7% of your retirement portfolio)
So my math that you called “silly” was spot on, unless you recently dumped shares at a loss.
1. This is an online message board for a college sports team, so grow-up
2. You never lose money until you sell
3. Stop being a chicken little, time it on your side
4. Buy, buy, buy, amazing value out there
You talked about companies being up with solid earnings, but the companies with the BEST earnings were already down at the time of your post. #fullofcrap
As for ARKK - you still haven't figured it out. Keep thinking.
1. Agree (except for growing up)
2. Agree to disagree
3. Disagree because the timing of purchases is one of the most critical aspects of investing even if your long the market - I.e., buy low sell high
4. Disagree with the exception of a few stocks/sectors; I only buy when stocks are on sale - more pain ahead - then time to buy
3. Power of DCA
It's not about timing the market, but how much time you are in the market. Words to live by, so you don't miss out again like you did last spring.
You've referred to Elon as a "snake oil salesman". More than once iirc. Clearly you think he is intentionally misleading investors and/or customers.
The judge thought he was intentionally misleading investors:
Judge deems Musk's 'funding secured' tweet false and misleading. A trial awaits
Judge deems Musk's 'funding secured' tweet false and misleading. A trial awaits
Already sanctioned by the SEC on a fraud charge, Elon Musk and Tesla fight a civil suit on his buyout claim.
DCA really only works when you buy a stock at fair value (or perceived FV) that is then driven down by market forces unrelated to company performance or dislocation. Otherwise, DCA something like ARKK down from $160 to current levels and it’s nothing but a prayer because the valuation was so out of whack.
I’ve never said he is one. But, I’m not convinced that in 10 years we will all view him in the same light. If he delivers on his promises, I’ll be happy to admit I was wrong. But, it would be great if stopped with the crypto nonsense/pumping and focused on selling cars. And, the Aspergers announcement would have been better received if done in conjunction with an effort to help those with special needs. Announcing it on SNL was a stunt to help his image. If he announced it along with a massive donation or creation of a foundation his performance would have gone down in history.
Did you know there's a search feature on here? I'm going to guess no.
Anyway, keep on lying. Pretty soon Tesla will run out of customers since only Silicon Valley elitists buy them. And Elon should really hire you to help him with his image and tell him what to do.
Tesla privately admits Elon Musk has been exaggerating about ‘full self-driving’
Musk’s comments do not match the “engineering reality.”
www.google.com
I think “liar” is a bit extreme. I’m trying to figure out your angle because you take Musk and Tesla way too seriously. He’s just a man and it’s just a car company - sorry, I meant car, crypto, battery, data, service, solar, regulatory credit company (hope I didn’t miss anything). I honestly don’t think I ever said he is a snake-oil salesman, but I’m pretty sure I’ve said he was starting to resemble one with BS delivery/production promises, BTC pumping, Solar Roof debacle, Doge-1 crap, etc. And, he SHOULD fire his PR team because revealing Aspergers on SNL was nothing short of idiotic - it’s a f’in comedy skit show that airs at 11:30 PM. If he really wanted to bring awareness to Aspergers (and be immortalized in history) all it would have taken is an interview with Ellen or Barbara Walters and creation of a special needs foundation.
Lol, please give it up. Read again. My post said, and you even highlighted that I said: “Another very solid day for my portfolio of companies that consistently generate solid earnings.” Not the companies with the best earnings are having a solid day. Lol. If you don’t understand the difference, then I suggest someone close to you to read it and explain it to you.
BTW, go check out this thing called the “Internet” where you can see what people really thought about Musk’s performance and the reaction from the Asperger’s community. Apparently, Asperger’s is no longer a medical diagnosis and, most importantly, the autistic community DOES NOT want anyone using it because it means “autistic person the nazis decided deserved to live”. The name comes from Hans Asperger, a nazi scientist that helped determine which autistic people were sent to the camps rather than being killed outright. Brilliant Musk!!!
Nice first earnings report from RBLX:
www.cnbc.com
Roblox revenue grows 140% in first earnings report since company went public
Roblox revenue grew 140% in the company's first earnings report since it went public.
In the hope of bringing the thread back to investment discussion, I’m pasting in an excerpt from the Berkshire Hathaway 1992 letter to shareholders (full letter is linked below, and I would highly recommend reading it especially the section in look through earnings - nothing better anchors an investor to business performance and rate of return. Anyone who owns a portfolio of stocks should consider evaluating their portfolio on a look through basis). In the excerpt below, note the discussion on value and growth, and the final paragraph on margin of safety.
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what
it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report:
"We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we
would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want
the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with
favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent
people; and (d) available at a very attractive price." We have
seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both
market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive
price" for "a very attractive price."
But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"?
In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose
between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition:
"value" and "growth." Indeed, many investment professionals see
any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-
dressing.
We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be
confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the
two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component
in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose
importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact
can be negative as well as positive.
In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is
redundant. What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking
value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously
paying more for a stock than its calculated value - in the hope
that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price - should be
labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor - in our
view - financially fattening).
Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is
widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having
attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-
earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such
characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from
determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something
for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the
principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly,
opposite characteristics - a high ratio of price to book value, a
high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield - are in no way
inconsistent with a "value" purchase.
Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about
value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value,
sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is
far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured
money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or
worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better
if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more
the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.
Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can
invest at incremental returns that are enticing - in other words,
only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a
dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return
business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.
In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago,
John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we
condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is
determined by the cash inflows and outflows - discounted at an
appropriate interest rate - that can be expected to occur during
the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same
for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and
difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a
coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the
case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the
future "coupons." Furthermore, the quality of management affects
the bond coupon only rarely - chiefly when management is so inept
or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast,
the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity
"coupons."
The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash
calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should
purchase - irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't,
displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a
high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book
value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown
equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable:
When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment,
they should be bought.
Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own
is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of
incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst
business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite - that
is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low
rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very
hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little
capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if
it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant
stock repurchases.
Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate
equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is
experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating
future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this
problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we
believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple
and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to
constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash
flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What
counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but
rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An
investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she
avoids big mistakes.
Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety
in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock
to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in
buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly
emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment
success.
Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what
it was fifteen years ago, when we said in the 1977 annual report:
"We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we
would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want
the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with
favorable long-term prospects; (c) operated by honest and competent
people; and (d) available at a very attractive price." We have
seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both
market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive
price" for "a very attractive price."
But how, you will ask, does one decide what's "attractive"?
In answering this question, most analysts feel they must choose
between two approaches customarily thought to be in opposition:
"value" and "growth." Indeed, many investment professionals see
any mixing of the two terms as a form of intellectual cross-
dressing.
We view that as fuzzy thinking (in which, it must be
confessed, I myself engaged some years ago). In our opinion, the
two approaches are joined at the hip: Growth is always a component
in the calculation of value, constituting a variable whose
importance can range from negligible to enormous and whose impact
can be negative as well as positive.
In addition, we think the very term "value investing" is
redundant. What is "investing" if it is not the act of seeking
value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously
paying more for a stock than its calculated value - in the hope
that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price - should be
labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor - in our
view - financially fattening).
Whether appropriate or not, the term "value investing" is
widely used. Typically, it connotes the purchase of stocks having
attributes such as a low ratio of price to book value, a low price-
earnings ratio, or a high dividend yield. Unfortunately, such
characteristics, even if they appear in combination, are far from
determinative as to whether an investor is indeed buying something
for what it is worth and is therefore truly operating on the
principle of obtaining value in his investments. Correspondingly,
opposite characteristics - a high ratio of price to book value, a
high price-earnings ratio, and a low dividend yield - are in no way
inconsistent with a "value" purchase.
Similarly, business growth, per se, tells us little about
value. It's true that growth often has a positive impact on value,
sometimes one of spectacular proportions. But such an effect is
far from certain. For example, investors have regularly poured
money into the domestic airline business to finance profitless (or
worse) growth. For these investors, it would have been far better
if Orville had failed to get off the ground at Kitty Hawk: The more
the industry has grown, the worse the disaster for owners.
Growth benefits investors only when the business in point can
invest at incremental returns that are enticing - in other words,
only when each dollar used to finance the growth creates over a
dollar of long-term market value. In the case of a low-return
business requiring incremental funds, growth hurts the investor.
In The Theory of Investment Value, written over 50 years ago,
John Burr Williams set forth the equation for value, which we
condense here: The value of any stock, bond or business today is
determined by the cash inflows and outflows - discounted at an
appropriate interest rate - that can be expected to occur during
the remaining life of the asset. Note that the formula is the same
for stocks as for bonds. Even so, there is an important, and
difficult to deal with, difference between the two: A bond has a
coupon and maturity date that define future cash flows; but in the
case of equities, the investment analyst must himself estimate the
future "coupons." Furthermore, the quality of management affects
the bond coupon only rarely - chiefly when management is so inept
or dishonest that payment of interest is suspended. In contrast,
the ability of management can dramatically affect the equity
"coupons."
The investment shown by the discounted-flows-of-cash
calculation to be the cheapest is the one that the investor should
purchase - irrespective of whether the business grows or doesn't,
displays volatility or smoothness in its earnings, or carries a
high price or low in relation to its current earnings and book
value. Moreover, though the value equation has usually shown
equities to be cheaper than bonds, that result is not inevitable:
When bonds are calculated to be the more attractive investment,
they should be bought.
Leaving the question of price aside, the best business to own
is one that over an extended period can employ large amounts of
incremental capital at very high rates of return. The worst
business to own is one that must, or will, do the opposite - that
is, consistently employ ever-greater amounts of capital at very low
rates of return. Unfortunately, the first type of business is very
hard to find: Most high-return businesses need relatively little
capital. Shareholders of such a business usually will benefit if
it pays out most of its earnings in dividends or makes significant
stock repurchases.
Though the mathematical calculations required to evaluate
equities are not difficult, an analyst - even one who is
experienced and intelligent - can easily go wrong in estimating
future "coupons." At Berkshire, we attempt to deal with this
problem in two ways. First, we try to stick to businesses we
believe we understand. That means they must be relatively simple
and stable in character. If a business is complex or subject to
constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash
flows. Incidentally, that shortcoming doesn't bother us. What
counts for most people in investing is not how much they know, but
rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An
investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she
avoids big mistakes.
Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety
in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock
to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in
buying. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly
emphasized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment
success.
Chairman's Letter - 1992
www.berkshirehathaway.com
Appreciate you grounding us. We have gotten carried away. With the tech wreck underway, the question is when is the time to start buying?
I brought AMZN at 3145 and also AMD this morning. Some of the other techs I would start nibbling and buy in increments since no one knows the bottom. Even ARKK looks tempting at 38% below the high But I like to buy individual stocks. I hope you have money to buy. I normally start buying down 12-13% and think I really have a bargain at 15-20% down. These are the stable Tech companies with somewhat reasonable PE for growth companies. I reviews the charts to see a good entry point.
I always like to get up early to buy pre market because you always get the best prices. Buy at your own risk.
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Looks like I might have been a tad early on this trade. I hope people bought protection and volatility.
Looks like Musk is jumping in the muddy waters. Must be as real as BTC and other crypto because Tesla is considering accepting it. Now just imagine if all the companies allocate .01% of their cash position in Doge, it would go to the moon.
Palantir is getting obliterated. Down 11% this morning. I bought and sold it between $20-$24 now I’m wondering where’s the floor. May be worth a look. AirBnb is my fav of the recent IPOs but I’ve been waiting for the June lock-up expiration before jumping in. ARKK is toast today - under $100. Now it’s getting interesting but I can’t help but feel like there is more pain ahead. The power of the media may hurt CW now that she is on full display.
ARKK beta is consistently increasing as she pushes her own holdings lower. Her downside capture is off the charts.
There is a chance at a short covering rally as hedge funds continue to be behind the eight ball:
What is remarkable is just how sensitive to overall market beta the hedge fund space has become, and there is a reason for that: according to Goldman Prime, overall book Gross leverage rose +1.7 pts to 247.1%, the highest on record, while Net leverage fell -0.9 pts to 88.2% (not quite an all time high, but still 87th percentile).
ZeroHedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
Sorry - stupid question but what does this mean for ARKK performance in the current environment?
This is the 2nd time The Verge ran this article since March. I guess if you didn't get enough clicks the first time, run the same story again. I'm guessing you just read the headline rather than the article. Clickbait.Tesla privately admits Elon Musk has been exaggerating about ‘full self-driving’
Musk’s comments do not match the “engineering reality.”
The funds five and three year beta are both around 1.5. But most of that was when the fund was much smaller. If you watch it this year, it has increased quite a bit mostly due to the size of the fund. Her beta is probably over 2 right now (but I haven't actually calculated it so that is a guess). When they buy or sell a stock they are pushing it around and increasing the vol of that individual stock. (She claimed recently that they aren't seeing any increase trading costs but that is laughable).
More concerning is the downside capture is much higher than the upside capture. So on up days she seems to stay with the nasdaq but on down days she is down twice the nasdaq or more. If the market goes higher they will be fine, if it goes lower it will obviously crush them. But if the market goes sideway,s and the vol stays high it will eat away at their returns as they will lose more on down days than they make on up days.
+1
The Little Bears fall for this "news" story every time! LOL.
PLTR is a textbook example of a company having an amazing product but not a good business. I don't know why there is such a disconnect, likely their leadership. Once again, amazing data technology, but more is needed to be successful.
Gotta live for these days! Amazing buying opportunities thanks to the chicken littles. Don't miss out.
Well, you had to sell before to have a lot of cash to buy in situations like this. I’m 70-75% cash but with be down to 25-30% cash in two weeks.
Look into NOW as well. TWLO also is way below market value and will snap back to $400'ish in short order.
And can't forget GOOGL.
Would you rather I link the article about sales in China fell sharply?
The China problem was weeks/months in the making. Tunnel-vision will cost investors a lot of money. My biggest decision of the day is whether I nibble on some spec tech at today’s yard sale, or wait and see how bad it gets. Whereas, the usual suspects are trying to decide whether to keep digging their DCA hole after buying spec tech stocks at all-time highs.
